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Design and Assessment of 
Renewable Electricity Auctions in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Hugo Lucas,1 Pablo del Río2 and Mohamed Youba Sokona3
Abstract Auctions have recently been regarded as a useful alternative 
to other support schemes for setting the remuneration of renewable 
electricity (RES-E) worldwide. They have also been increasingly adopted in 
the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region, mostly due to their promise to support 
the deployment of RES-E projects cost-effectively. The aim of this article is 
to identify the design elements of RES-E auctions in SSA and assess their 
pros and cons with respect to different criteria. The results show that the 
design elements adopted in the SSA auctions are similar to other countries, 
but some design elements are deemed very relevant in order to address 
specific constraints to RES-E investments in SSA countries, including 
pre-selection of sites, technology-specific (solar PV), and price-only 
auctions. However, the main distinctive feature of auctions in SSA is that 
they are part of a broader policy mix of support mechanisms aimed at 
de-risking and providing technical support.
Keywords: sub-Saharan Africa, renewable energy, auctions, PV, 
design elements, policy mix.
1 Introduction
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have experienced or are 
currently experiencing an energy crisis. Six-hundred million people 
in SSA lack access to electricity (Castellanos et al. 2015). With an 
electrification rate of  only 26 per cent (World Bank 2017), the region 
has 13 per cent of  the world’s population, but 48 per cent of  the share 
of  the global population without access to electricity. SSA is the only 
region in the world where the absolute number of  people living without 
electricity is increasing (IEA 2014: 30).
Some authors provide in-depth analyses of  the SSA electricity sector 
(see Castellanos et al. 2015; KPMG 2016; Quitzow et al. 2016; Eberhard 
et al. 2016; Climatescope 2016; IEA 2014). Several factors are behind 
the energy crisis, including high-demand growth, low installed capacity, 
non-cost recovering tariffs, low utilisation rate of  existing capacity, 
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ageing, insufficient, and poorly maintained power infrastructures 
leading to transmission and distribution losses, dominance of  one 
energy source (hydro), and negligible power trading across countries. 
Large investments are thus required to address this energy crisis.4
Electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) has the potential 
to mitigate the energy crisis since it is domestically available, it can 
be cost-competitive, and deployed much faster than fossil fuel-based 
power plants. It can trigger additional economic benefits and it is a core 
component for any low-carbon strategy, offering important environmental 
co-benefits, including improved local air quality (Quitzow et al. 2016).
However, non-hydro RES-E represents a tiny fraction of  SSA’s electricity 
mix. Renewables accounted for around 30 per cent of  SSA-installed 
capacity in power generation (about 31GW) in 2016. However, most 
of  this capacity is hydro-based (25 per cent, 25GW), with other RES 
accounting for only 5 per cent (6GW). Fossil fuels account for the largest 
share (68 per cent, 67GW), followed by nuclear (2 per cent, 1.9GW) 
(estimations based on IRENA 2017a and UNSD 2017).
Strong barriers to RES-E in SSA persist. A useful theoretical framework 
on the barriers to investments in RES-E in less developed regions, such 
as SSA, is provided by Pueyo et al. (2015). According to these authors, 
RES-E investments face three types of  constraints: economic/financial, 
regulatory/political and technical, which are more severe in developing 
countries (ibid.: 32). In particular, the economics of  renewable energy 
projects in developing countries are more challenging due to: (i) the 
capital-intensive nature of  RES-E projects, which amplifies funding 
cost differentials; (ii) the higher level of  perceived risk, which raises 
costs through the higher cost of  finance and the larger share of  equity 
in a project’s finance structure; (iii) the lack of  domestic debt-finance 
of  suitable maturity, and scarcity of  equity finance, particularly private 
equity; and (iv) low prices of  electricity that prevent cost-recovery 
(ibid.: 30). Several studies have identified the specific barriers to RES-E 
in SSA (The Economist 2016; Quitzow et al. 2016; Castellanos et al. 2015; 
Climatescope 2016). The required capital spending in the power sector 
is an unbearable financial burden for government budgets (Castellanos 
et al. 2015). But other (interrelated) barriers include higher capital 
costs than elsewhere due to higher risks (The Economist 2016), different 
types of  risks (construction and operation, foreign exchange and 
country risks), poor financial health of  utilities (Quitzow et al. 2016), 
off-taker risk (Eberhard et al. 2016), the structure of  the electricity sector 
(dominated by single, and often state-owned utilities responsible for a 
large share of  generation, transmission, and distribution) (Climatescope 
2016), technical limitations of  weak grids (The Economist 2016; Quitzow 
et al. 2016; Eberhard et al. 2016), artificially low tariffs, and the large 
amounts of  investments being required.
Different barriers could justify the adoption of  different policies (policy 
mix). Pueyo et al (2015) identify several policies to address the different 
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constraints to RES-E investments (economic/financial,  
regulatory/political, and technical). Focusing on the economic and 
financial barriers, administratively-set feed-in tariffs (FITs) and feed-in 
premiums (FIPs) are main alternatives to address those barriers. Under 
FITs, a total payment per MWh of  RES-E generated, paid in the form 
of  guaranteed prices and combined with a purchase obligation by 
the utilities is provided. Under FIPs, a payment per KWh on top of  
the electricity wholesale-market price is granted. FITs were adopted 
in a number of  SSA countries in the past, including Ghana, Kenya, 
South Africa, and Uganda. However, they only delivered very small 
investments in SSA (Kruger and Eberhard 2016; Eberhard et al. 2016). 
Some of  these countries (Ghana, South Africa, and Uganda), but also 
others in the SSA region have recently implemented auctions as a more 
appealing instrument than FITs, following the successful experience in 
South Africa and elsewhere. Auctions have also been implemented in 
Burkina Faso, Zambia, Namibia, Ethiopia, and Mauritius.
An auction is a process in which a good or several goods are offered 
up for bidding. In so-called procurement auctions, an auctioneer will 
buy the good (RES-E), from the bidder(s) offering the best bid, for 
example lowest support level (AURES 2017). The main differences with 
respect to FITs are: (i) auctions are more transparent in the setting of  
support levels; (ii) support is restricted to those being awarded in the 
auction; and (iii) FITs are an open window for a long period of  time. 
Project developers can apply for the FIT anytime whereas, in tenders, 
project developers can only apply when a call is open. Auctions are 
now implemented in 67 countries worldwide (up from six countries in 
2005) (IRENA 2017b). The attractiveness of  auctions lies in several 
advantages compared to administratively-set support. They mitigate the 
information asymmetry problem when setting remuneration levels; they 
are particularly suitable to control costs, expansion, and the technology 
mix; and they are more likely to lead to allocative efficiency (Haufe and 
Ehrhart 2015).
Auctions have increasingly been adopted due to their alleged 
advantages in terms of  efficiency in RES-E promotion. This is 
something particularly convenient in developing countries, where 
economic resources are more limited, given budget constraints (Spratt 
et al. 2016). A critical problem in these countries is the unavailability of  
finance. Financial markets tend to be immature and perceived risks are 
higher (Spratt et al. 2016: 7), which raises the cost of  finance.
Whether auctions will fulfil the expectations depends on the choice of  
design elements but also on their combination with other instruments 
(i.e. a policy mix). Therefore, the aim of  this article is to analyse recent 
experiences with RES-E auctions in SSA. The pros and cons of  their 
design elements are assessed, and an analysis of  the functioning of  those 
schemes with respect to different criteria is provided. Whereas previous 
contributions have analysed specific schemes, mostly the South African 
one (see e.g. Eberhard, Kolker and Leigland 2014; del Río 2016), but 
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Table 1 Main design elements in RES-E auctions
Design element Description
Volume
There are three main ways to set the volume auctioned: capacity (MW), generation (MWh) or 
budget (million ¤). 
Timing
The existence of regular rounds with a schedule is a critical design element. The alternative is 
stand-alone auctions, i.e. set at irregular intervals. 
Diversity
Diversity with respect to technologies, locations, actors, and sizes of the installations could be 
promoted in an auction by organising different auctions per alternative (e.g. technology-neutral 
vs technology-specific), by including minimum quota per alternative, by providing different 
remuneration levels for different alternatives, or by lowering pre-qualification requirements or 
penalties for specific categories (i.e. small actors).
Participating 
conditions: facilitation 
and requirements
Several elements may facilitate the participation in an auction, while others are rather 
requirements for this participation:
• Streamlining of administrative procedures
• Supporting dialogue with stakeholders and information provision (e.g. measurement of resource 
potentials)
• Pre-qualification requirements are required in order to participate in the bidding procedure 
and are adopted to prove the seriousness of bids. They can refer to specifications of the offered 
project (such as technical requirements, documentation requirements, and preliminary licences) 
or to the bidding party (providing evidence of the technical or financial capability of the bidding 
party). They also include economic guarantees (bid bonds).
• Local content rules refer to the requirement to use renewable energy equipment which is 
manufactured by local firms.
Support conditions: 
types and forms of 
remuneration
Remuneration in an auction can be provided for generation (MWh) or capacity (MW). 
Generation-based remuneration can be provided as full payment (FIT) or through a premium 
top-up on the market price (FIP).
Selection criteria
Price-only auctions are organised using only one criterion (the bid price). In multi-criteria auctions, 
the price is the main criterion among other criteria (e.g. local content rules, deliverability, impact 
on local R&D, industry and jobs, and environmental impacts).
Auction format
In a single-item auction there is a single product which is allocated to a single owner and the 
product cannot be split (e.g. 50MW of PV are allocated to a single bidder, to be deployed at a 
specific site). In a multi-item auction the auctioned product is split among different owners and 
bids are submitted for only part or the total auctioned amount (e.g. 50MW of PV are allocated to 
several bidders, to be deployed at a specific site or in different places).
Auction type
Under sealed-bid auctions, project developers simultaneously submit their bids with an undisclosed 
offer of the price at which the electricity would be sold. An auctioneer ranks and awards projects 
until the sum of the quantities offered covers the volume of energy being auctioned. Under 
the multi-round descending-clock auction, the auctioneer offers a price in an initial round, and 
developers bid with offers of the quantity they would be willing to provide at that price. The 
auctioneer then progressively lowers the offered price in successive rounds until the quantity in a 
bid matches the quantity to be procured. Hybrid models may use the descending-clock auction in 
a first phase and the sealed-bid auction in a second phase.
Pricing rules
Under uniform pricing, all winners receive the strike price set by the last bid needed to meet the 
quota (highest accepted bid) or the first bid that does not meet the quota (lowest rejected bid). 
Under the pay-as-bid (PAB) alternative, the strike price sets the amount of generation eligible for 
support and each winner receives his/her bid.
Price ceilings In order to limit the costs of support, the auctioneer can set a maximum bid price.
Realisation period Deadlines are set for building the projects which have been awarded contracts.
Penalties
Penalties can take different forms: they can forbid participation in successive auctions, reduce the 
level of support, reduce the length of the support period by the time of the delay, lead to the 
confiscation of bid bonds or result in penalty payments.
Source Authors’ own elaboration based on del Río et al. (2015a).
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also Uganda (e.g. Castalia LLC 2016) and Zambia (Lucas 2016), there 
is not a joint comparison of  different schemes in SSA, which are very 
recent. The pros and cons of  their design elements have not been 
studied. Those design elements have not been compared with auctions 
for RES-E worldwide. Finally, their functioning has not been assessed in 
a systematic manner, using different criteria.
Accordingly, this article is structured as follows. The next section provides 
the analytical framework for the analysis of  the choice of  design elements 
in RES-E auctions. Section 3 explains the methodology followed in the 
analysis of  those design elements in SSA countries. The analysis is carried 
out in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.
2 Analytical framework: components for the assessment of design 
elements in auctions for RES-E5
Before an auction is implemented to promote RES-E investments, 
governments must consider whether this is an appropriate mechanism, 
taking into account their energy policy priorities. An analysis of  the 
market should be carried out, including potential bidders, potential 
barriers to RES-E deployment, the situation of  the supply chain, grid 
infrastructures, and so forth. Then specific design elements can be 
chosen. These are highly context-specific and what works in one market 
is not necessarily applicable to another.
2.1 Design elements in auctions for RES
The most relevant design elements in RES-E auctions are described in 
Table 1 (see del Río et al. 2015a and del Río 2017a for further details).
Table 2 Description of the criteria and indicators
Criteria Description
Effectiveness ‘A priori effectiveness’: degree to which the volume 
offered is contracted. ‘Realisation rate effectiveness’: 
degree to which the volume contracted is actually 
built.
Static efficiency (direct and 
indirect costs)
Reaching the target at the lowest possible system 
generation costs (¤, ¤/MWh). An auction outcome 
is efficient if the bidders with the lowest generation 
costs are awarded. The relevant costs here include 
generation costs and transaction costs. Indirect costs 
(balancing, profile, and grid costs (¤, ¤/MWh)) should 
be included.
Impact on the local supply 
chain
This refers to impacts on the local supply chain.
Actor diversity The participation of small actors is actively 
encouraged. 
Source Adapted from del Río et al. (2015a).
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2.2 Assessment criteria
Defining ‘success’ in the choice of  design elements is certainly not a 
trivial issue. Assessment criteria are used for this purpose. Although 
effectiveness and (static) efficiency are the most common criteria used in 
the assessments, several contributions expand the set of  relevant criteria 
to include other aspects, such as dynamic efficiency, impact on the local 
supply chain, and actor diversity (see del Río et al. 2015a). However, 
an unambiguously preferred ranking of  criteria does not exist in the 
literature. Table 2 describes the criteria considered in this article.6
Static efficiency refers to the minimisation of  the (system) costs of  
RES-E generation, which can be disaggregated into direct and indirect 
costs. The former include installation, operation, and maintenance of  
renewable energy technologies. Direct generation costs refer in this 
article to allocative efficiency, to which the equi-marginality principle 
applies.7 Indirect costs refer to balancing, profile, and grid costs.8
2.3 Market, bidders and system effects
The links between specific design elements and criteria to assess those 
design elements are mediated by the effects on bidders and the market. 
Design elements affect the participation of  bidders in the auction 
by influencing the costs, risks, and expected benefits of  participation 
(bid levels with respect to generation costs). In general, the higher the 
costs, the higher the risks or the lower the expected benefits, the lower 
the number of  participants (del Río 2015). The lower the level of  
competition, the higher the bid prices and the lower the efficiency of  
the auction (Haufe and Ehrhart 2015). Effectiveness is affected by those 
design options with an impact on investors’ risks (negative influence), 
competition (negative influence, since a higher level of  competition 
induces more aggressive bidding and, eventually, underbidding and 
underbuilding), and bid levels (the higher these levels, the higher the 
realisation rate). The impact at bidders’ level translates into market 
effects, which include the number of  bidders in the auction, the 
diversity of  those bidders, and their market concentration. In turn, 
these aspects have consequences on the functioning of  the auction 
(assessed with the aforementioned criteria).
3 Method
The analysis of  the design elements in SSA auctions is based on country 
case studies. We have selected those countries which have implemented 
auctions for RES-E and where winning projects have been awarded 
contracts as of  1 February 2017. These include Zambia, Uganda, 
and Ghana. Zambia should be lauded for being one of  the first SSA 
countries to run a solar tender efficiently and effectively. The Uganda 
tender for solar is one of  the main pillars of  a comprehensive support 
framework for small-scale renewable energy deployment, the GET FiT 
programme, that converts the awarded FIP into a grant fully reimbursed 
after the first five years of  operation of  the project. Ghana was one of  
the first countries in SSA to introduce a Renewable Energy Act along 
with a FIT scheme that attracted the interest of  many developers looking 
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to develop up to 1.5GW of  RES-E-based power plants. However, 
given the low credit worthiness of  the off-taker and the inability of  
the government to provide a credit enhancement mechanism, only a 
20MWp solar PV plant was built under the FIT. In order to unlock 
the pipeline of  projects and select good projects at low prices, the 
government launched a first auction in 2015.9 The RES-E auctions 
analysed in SSA are based on PV. They aim to diversify the electricity 
generation mix, reducing the dependence on hydro and conventional 
electricity sources, in a context of  fast-growing populations, economies 
and, thus, electricity demand and considerable solar potentials in those 
countries. PV projects are deemed particularly suitable for auctions, 
given their maturity, standardised nature, and the likely high degree of  
international competition in PV compared to other RES-E technologies 
(e.g. biomass). The three countries have implemented their first and 
only auction for RES-E during 2014 and 2016. This is in contrast to 
South Africa, the country in the SSA region with the largest (seven-year) 
experience in the organisation of  RES-E auctions.
Table 3 Main socioeconomic and power sector data for the selected countries (2015)
Ghana Uganda Zambia
Nominal GDP (US$ billion) 36.2 21.9 16.2
GDP per capita (US$) 1,343 619 1,044
Real GDP annual growth (%) 3.4 5.4 3.1
Population (million) 27.4 39 16.2
Unemployment (% of labour 
force)
4.3 4.1 13.3
Ease of doing business within 
SSA (1: most friendly, 47: least 
friendly)
11 12 6
Electricity generation mix (%)
Hydro: 73
Oil: 20
Gas: 7
Hydro: 80
Oil: 14
Other 
renewables 
(biomass): 6
Hydro: 97
Oil: 3
Net installed capacity (GW) 3.1 0.9 1.9
Total electricity generation (TWh) 14.1 3.8 11.3
Transmission and distribution 
losses (%)
27.6 7 16.3
Electrification rate (%) 76 15 26
Per capita electricity 
consumption (KWh)
362.1 83.8 583.2
Source Based on data from KPMG (2016), IEA (2017).
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Table 4 Design elements in auctions for RES-E in selected SSA countries
Design element (category and 
subcategory)
Uganda Zambia Ghana Rest of the world*
Period and technological scope 11 months 
(January–
December 2014)
Small PV (< 5MW)
2016 PV 12 months 
(November 2015–
November 2016) 
PV
1 Volume Generation (GEN), 
budget (BUD) or 
capacity-based 
(CAP)
CAP (20MW) CAP (2x50MW) CAP (20MW) CAP: 21
BUD: 4
GEN: 4
2 Periodicity Schedule (Y/N) N N N Y: 10 N: 16
3 Diversity Technology-neutral 
(TN), multi-
technology (MT) 
and technology-
specific (TS)
TS (solar PV) TS (solar PV) TS (Solar PV) TS: 20
MT: 2
TN: 5
Geographically 
neutral (Y/N)
N; preferred zones 
for the location 
identified
N (site-specific) Y; the developer 
chooses the site 
in coordination 
with the off-taker 
(ECG)
Y: 17
N: 9
Actor neutral (Y/N) Y Y Y Y: 25 N: 1
Size neutral (Y/N) N Maximum 
project capacity 
5MW
N N Maximum 
project capacity 
20MW
Y: 10 N: 16
4 Participation 
conditions
Pre-qualification 
requirements
Previous 
experience, 
financial capability
Bids and 
performance 
bonds
Experience, 
expertise, and 
financial resources
Bid bonds
Technical 
requirements
Technical criterion: 
successful 
track record of 
developing PV 
projects
Financial criterion: 
submission of 
financial statement 
for at least 3 years; 
show positive 
value of equity and 
profits for each of 
the last 3 years
Variable
Local content rules 
(Y/N)
N N Y (minimum of 
20%)
Y: 11 N: 15
Information 
provision (Y/N)
Y N Y Y: 6 N: 20
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Table 4 Design elements in auctions for RES-E in selected SSA countries (cont.)
Design element (category and 
subcategory)
Uganda Zambia Ghana Rest of the world*
5 Support cost 
condition
Type of 
remuneration 
(capacity vs 
generation)
Generation Generation Generation GEN: 24
CAP: 3
Form of 
remuneration  
(FIT, sliding FIP, 
fixed FIP)
Sliding FIP 
(difference 
between winning 
bid prices and a FIT 
11 US cents/KWh)
FIT FIT FIT: 17
sFIP: 8
fFIP: 1
6 Selection 
criteria
Price-only vs 
multi-criteria
Multi-criteria
70% price
30% (technical, 
financial, 
environmental, and 
social parameters)
Price Price Price: 18
Multi-criteria: 8
7 Auction format Multi vs  
single-item
Multi Single (project-
specific)
Single-item Single: 6
Multi: 20
8 Auction type Static, dynamic, 
and hybrid
Static Static Static Static: 25
Dynamic: 0
Hybrid: 1
9 Pricing rules PAB vs uniform PAB PAB PAB PAB: 21
Uniform: 3
First-price: 3
10 Ceiling prices Ceiling prices (Y/N) Y N Y (ceiling price is 
the FIT)
Y: 19
N: 7
11 Realisation 
period
Deadlines for 
construction (years)
2 1 2 Variable
12 Penalties Contract 
termination, 
confiscation 
of bids, and 
performance 
bonds
Contract 
termination, bid 
bond withheld
Contract 
termination, 
confiscation 
of bids, and 
performance 
bonds
Variable
Source Authors’ own elaboration.  
*Number of countries applying each design element.
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The research consisted of  country fieldwork and desktop research. 
Secondary literature, official data, and documents were consulted. This 
was complemented with interviews with relevant stakeholders in the 
three countries. Table 3 compares the chosen countries on the basis 
of  selected socioeconomic and energy indicators. The three countries 
are similar in some respects (medium-size, low gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita levels, moderate GDP growth rates, and power 
mixes strongly based on hydro). However, they show some differences 
regarding some indicators. Unemployment is comparatively higher 
in Zambia. Transmission and distribution losses are relatively high in 
Zambia, and especially in Ghana, and much more modest in Uganda. 
Ghana has a high electrification rate, which is very low in both Zambia 
and Uganda. Finally, per capita electricity consumption is orders of  
magnitude lower in Uganda than in the other two countries.
4 Results
4.1 Design elements
Table 4 summarises and compares the design elements in the three 
countries. It also shows which design elements are more common in the 
rest of  the world (last column).10
A main feature of  the schemes in SSA is the strong involvement of  
international institutions and donors, which have provided funding 
and technical assistance. In Zambia, a main role has been played by 
the World Bank through the Scaling Solar programme. Scaling Solar 
provides advice to assess the right size and location for solar PV power 
plants in the country’s grid; simple and rapid tendering to ensure strong 
participation and competition from committed industry players; fully 
developed templates of  bankable project documents that can reduce 
negotiation time; concessional financing and insurance attached to the 
tender; delivering competitive bidding and ensuring rapid financial 
close; risk management; and credit enhancement products to lower 
financing costs and deliver power at lower tariffs.
In Uganda, external support was also provided to implement a 
tendering process, in this case through the GET FiT programme. 
GET FiT is supported by the governments of  Norway, the UK and 
Germany, the EU (through the EU Africa Infrastructure Fund) and the 
World Bank (GET FiT Uganda 2015). The main support instruments 
implemented within the GET FiT programme include: the GET FiT 
Premium Payment Mechanism (GFPPM),11 a standardised set of  legal 
documents (including bankable power purchasing agreements (PPAs), 
implementation agreements, and developer financing agreements for 
small independent power producers (IPPs)), World Bank International 
Development Association (IDA) Partial Risk Guarantee (PRG) Facility, 
the Technical Assistance (TA) Facility,12 an interconnection component 
and additional funds to build new interconnection infrastructure and 
refurbish existing infrastructure (Castalia LLC 2016). A unique feature 
of  the GFPPM in Uganda is that donor-funded premium payments are 
received up-front. The developer will receive the first 50 per cent, of  the 
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total 20 years’ premium payment amount, upon commercial operation. 
The remaining 50 per cent is paid in annual 10 per cent tranches over 
the first five years of  operation. For biomass and hydro projects, the 
GFPPM is administratively set. However, due to the rapid fall in the 
price of  PV, it was decided that, for PV projects, the premium should be 
the result of  an auction process.
In Ghana, the government received technical assistance from GIZ 
(German Society for International Cooperation), which implemented the 
programme ‘Capacity for a Successful Implementation of  the Renewable 
Energy Act in Ghana’ (C-SIREA) to design an auction scheme that would 
allocate at least cost the scarce resources that the country could spend on 
credit enhancement mechanisms. C-SIREA supported the government 
in defining the auction process and features, preparing standardised 
documents (including minimum technical requirements) and supporting 
the established tender committee along the different phases of  the process 
through the provision of  technical and transaction advisers.
Regarding specific design elements adopted in SSA countries, most of  
them are standard in other countries (Table 4), such as volume defined 
in capacity terms (instead of  generation or budget), and remuneration 
based on generation (rather than on capacity). The absence of  a 
schedule for auctions is common to other countries, which is somehow 
surprising, given the detrimental consequences of  auctions at irregular 
intervals or infrequent ones in terms of  underbidding, higher investor 
risks, and constraints to the development of  a robust supply chain (see 
del Río 2017a).
We would like to stress the relevance of  some design elements applied 
in order to address the constraints to investments faced by many SSA 
countries.
A main difference from other countries is the lack of  geographical 
neutrality, with the exception of  South Africa, where auctions are 
geographically neutral. Auctions in SSA are either site-specific (Uganda 
and Zambia) or the off-taker has an important role in the choice of  the 
site (the developer chooses the site in coordination with the off-taker 
in Ghana). Site-specific auctions optimise the integration of  variable 
RES-E into the grid and reduce the administrative burden for project 
developers. In Uganda, preferred zones for project location were 
identified.13 In Zambia, the two projects (50MW each) will be located 
in the Lusaka South Multi-Facility Economic Zone. The pre-selection 
of  sites is related to the lack of  assessments of  the stability of  the grid 
and the weak grids in these countries, which encourages the location 
of  projects close to the grid. Simplicity and transparency of  design is 
key to attract investors in a high-risk perceived environment, as in SSA 
countries. This is why several design element choices have been made: 
technology-specific (only PV, rather than technology-neutral), sealed-bid 
with PAB (rather than dynamic auctions or static auctions with uniform 
pricing), and price-only auctions (instead of  multi-criteria-based tenders).
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Technological specificity usually brings benefits in terms of  dynamic 
efficiency (if  the least mature technologies are promoted). In general, 
a problem with lower neutrality is market segmentation, which 
could lead to few bidders and low competition in a given contingent, 
higher bids (higher support costs), and higher generation costs (lower 
static efficiency). However, in the case of  SSA, technology neutrality 
is unlikely to lead to more participation and greater competition. 
The reason is that auctions in this region are particularly suitable 
for PV, and therefore PV is likely to concentrate most projects in a 
technology-neutral auction anyway. Auctions in the SSA countries 
analysed are for PV only. This is in contrast to the auctions in South 
Africa where, in addition to PV, wind, small hydro, and biomass are 
included, although they are also technology-specific. There are many 
PV project developers in these countries. According to one interviewee, 
this is probably due to the simplicity of  these projects compared to 
other renewable technologies, such as biomass or hydro, where there 
are barely any projects being developed. Solar PV projects can be 
implemented more quickly and lead times are thus reduced, which 
make them particularly suitable for an auction, and for SSA countries 
which need to have additional generation sources rapidly implemented 
in order to cover increasing electricity demand needs in a context of  
power capacity deficits. For those other technology alternatives, an 
administratively-set FIT may make more sense. Donors have pushed 
strongly for auctions being based on PV in SSA.
Regarding auction type, static auctions have been the choice. Sealed 
bids are simpler than dynamic ones, leading to lower participation 
costs (Maurer and Barroso 2011). Not revealing information during 
the auction process becomes an advantage of  sealed-bid auctions when 
competition is weak because bidders could use that information to 
coordinate their bidding, increasing the final price of  the auction. Static 
auctions are less vulnerable to implicit collusion than dynamic ones 
(Haufe and Ehrhart 2015). However, the winner’s curse, which occurs 
when bidders do not know their actual valuation for the good, is more 
likely under static auctions.
The pricing rule has been based on pay-as-bid in the three countries, 
and also in South Africa. It is also the most common choice worldwide. 
The uniform pricing rule (lowest rejected bid) has a main theoretical 
advantage: it is incentive compatible, for example there is no incentive 
for cost exaggeration and bidders bid their true cost. The reason is that 
with uniform pricing and lowest rejected bid, the bidders’ own prices 
do not influence the price they will be paid in case of  winning (Haufe 
and Ehrhart 2015; Kahn et al. 2001; Federico and Rahman 2003). 
However, uniform pricing leads to uncertainties regarding award prices 
for bidders in case of  winning. Furthermore, in practice, the uniform 
pricing rule creates a risk of  irrational behaviour (underbidding), 
underbuilding and, thus, ineffectiveness (see del Río 2017a). The 
support is not inflation-indexed in the three countries.
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Two of  the auctions in SSA are price-only auctions (Zambia and 
Ghana) whereas, in Uganda, a multi-criteria auction has been 
implemented, in which the price represents only 30 per cent of  the 
criteria and technical, financial, environmental, and social parameters 
account for the rest. Price-only auctions would result in the lowest 
bidders being awarded contracts, whereas selection of  the preferred 
bidder on criteria other than price allows for the achievement of  
multiple policy objectives (e.g. local employment, local environment, 
industrial development, etc.) (del Río, Wigan and Steinhilber 2015b). 
However, the least-cost bidders might not be selected in multi-criteria 
auctions, leading to a lower allocative efficiency and higher support 
costs. According to one interviewee, this was the case in Uganda, where 
donors decided to implement a multi-criteria analysis among other 
reasons to line up the selection with their own policy goals. In South 
Africa, the multi-criteria auctions led to some local benefits (see del Río 
2016 for an overview) and a greater acceptance of  the scheme, but at 
the cost of  higher complexity (Kruger and Eberhard 2016) and lower 
transparency.
Pre-qualification requirements and penalties are standard measures 
to ensure the seriousness of  bids and that winning projects are built. 
But, if  set too stringently, they may discourage the participation of  
actors by increasing the costs of  participation, leading to lower levels of  
competition and higher bid prices and policy costs. This is not the case 
in the three countries being analysed. According to one interviewee, 
the technical requirements in Ghana should have been more precise. 
They were set in very general terms, subject to the interpretation of  
participants on the required information which had to be submitted. 
In contrast to the lax requirements in Ghana, technical specifications 
may have been too strict in Uganda, setting narrow requirements 
for individual components, rather than for the quality of  the power 
produced.
Finally, one country has implemented local content requirements 
(Ghana), whereas the other two have not. Local content requirements 
are a common practice in many countries around the world, with 
nearly half  having adopted them. Their main advantage is the positive 
local socioeconomic impacts, as in Uganda, where local development 
opportunities in the rural regions have been encouraged (also due 
to the project size limit and the selected site). But they may restrict 
participation in the auction, leading to lower competition and higher 
bids. This design element is particularly unsuitable when there is 
not a local supply chain in the specific technologies being eligible to 
participate in the auction, because it would result in higher energy costs 
with very modest local benefits. According to one interviewee, the part 
of  the supply chain which could be local was identified in Ghana and 
the 20 per cent local content requirement was set accordingly. Local 
content requirements may be in conflict with access to reliable and 
cheap energy, which is a main priority in SSA countries.
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4.2 Assessing the success of auctions in SSA
4.2.1 Actor diversity
The auctions in SSA have attracted a considerable number of  actors. 
In Zambia, 48 solar power developers were attracted, of  which 11 
were qualified and seven submitted final proposals (IFC 2016). Two 
companies were awarded contracts, despite the fact that a bidder 
submitted the lowest bids for the two sites. This is so because the Scaling 
Solar tender does not allow awarding both sites to the same bidder, 
which increases actor diversity (at the expense of  higher support costs). 
In Uganda, 24 expressions of  interest were received and nine qualified 
developers were invited to submit technical and price bids. Seven 
developers submitted their bid packages in August 2014. There were 
two winning bidders (Meyer, Tenenbaum and Hosier 2015). In Ghana, 
the auction launched in November 2015 attracted 33 developers, 18 
of  which were pre-qualified to submit a bid. Five applicants submitted 
technical and financial proposals and one bidder was recommended for 
negotiation (Behrle 2017).
Regarding the types of  actors, mostly large, international investors 
have been attracted, although some local developers have participated 
(in Uganda). In Zambia, they were mainly large, well-established 
companies, with company domicile mostly in Europe. In Uganda, five 
of  the pre-qualified companies were international solar developers and 
four were local companies. The high presence of  local developers can be 
explained by the small maximum size of  the projects (5MW) that reduces 
attractiveness for the larger international developers (Castalia LLC 2016) 
and the pre-existence of  a FIT since 2007 that spurred local project 
developers. The winners of  the auctions in the three countries show a 
combination of  African and international well-established firms. In the 
case of  Zambia, there were two winners, both international actors, a 
large utility from Italy (ENEL) and a PV project developer (First Solar). 
In the case of  Uganda, there were two winners (Access Power MEA 
and Building Energy). Access Power is a Middle East and Africa (MEA) 
project developer, founded in 2012. Founded in 2010, Building Energy 
is one of  most prominent Italian’s independent renewable energy power 
producers. In Ghana, BioTherm Energy is Africa’s leading IPP. This 
African-born utility has been successful in securing over 250MW of  
PPAs on the African continent in seven different countries.
4.2.2 Policy effectiveness
Regarding a priori effectiveness, the results can be deemed quite 
satisfactory. In Uganda and Ghana, 20MW were auctioned and they were 
all awarded, whereas in Zambia, 100MW were auctioned for the two 
projects (50MW each), and 73MW were awarded (45MW and 28MW).
It is difficult to judge effectiveness in terms of  realisation rate at this 
stage, since the deadline for building the projects has not ended. 
However, there are signs that they will be built. In Zambia, the projects 
are scheduled to be completed in Q3 2017. The fact that the two 
winners are well-established international companies and the de-risking 
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under the Scaling Solar programme are cause for optimism. One of  
the 10MW grid-connected solar PV plants awarded in Uganda entered 
into operation on November 2016. The other (also 10MW) has started 
construction and is expected to enter into operation in Q3 2017 (GET 
FiT Uganda 2017). The premium payment (a top-up to the FIT) offered 
by GET FiT was likely necessary for all power plants supported by the 
programme. Integration into the electricity system is guaranteed since 
the sites are preselected based on their capability to evacuate the power 
from the projects. In addition, investments in transmission infrastructure 
represent another pillar of  GET FiT. In Ghana, it is too early to tell 
whether the 20MWp PV project awarded in November 2016 will be 
built. Policy effectiveness has been high in South Africa, both regarding 
the capacity being procured as well as the capacity expected to enter 
into operation (South African Government 2015).
The relatively low volumes auctioned in the three cases mean that they 
will contribute marginally to the countries’ power mixes. However, 
a second round is expected in both Zambia and Ghana. In Uganda, 
the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) will promote an additional 
30MW of  solar PV (GET FiT Uganda 2015). According to one 
interviewee, one main advantage of  auctions with respect to FITs 
regarding effectiveness is that the sovereign guarantee to mitigate the 
off-taker risk (due to lack of  credibility of  the utility) provided by the 
government cannot be given to all projects applying for a FIT (due 
to scarce resources), and the auction allows the selection of  one or 
two projects, the best ones, to which the guarantee can be provided. 
Thus, bidders winning the auction know that they will receive such a 
guarantee, and investors’ risks are reduced accordingly. The fact that 
unsuccessful bidders have not complained is a sign that the processes 
were well developed and operated.
4.2.3 Static efficiency
Regarding the cost-effectiveness of  the schemes, the results are mixed. 
The Zambian auction has led to remarkable low prices (winning bids 
of  6.02 US cents/KWh and 7.84 US cents/KWh), which can be partly 
related to the low risks facilitated by the Scaling Solar programme. 
According to USAID (2016: 6), the concessional lending provided by 
the World Bank made these projects commercially viable. The fact 
that land is provided for free by the Zambian government and the 
denomination of  PPAs in dollars (which reduces currency risks for 
investors) has helped to further reduce costs. However, the pre-selection 
of  the site has been an issue in Zambia, with Eckhouse and Hirtenstein 
reporting criticisms by one of  the winners in the auction arguing that 
‘the location of  the project isn’t ideal… it’s not flat and has rocks that 
will need to be removed’ (2016). In addition, the sites are not in places 
with the highest level of  solar radiation in Zambia (del Río 2017b), but 
they are close to a new substation (Eckhouse and Hirtenstein 2016), 
which facilitates grid integration in a country with an underdeveloped 
grid. The first geographically-neutral wind auction in South Africa led 
to considerable challenges for grid connection and permit approvals for 
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the winning projects (Haffejee 2013), which suggests that the site was 
not optimal in terms of  transmission and land use and that site-specific 
auctions would have mitigated these problems.
In Uganda, the wining average price was 16.37 US cents/KWh, which 
was higher than in Zambia and South Africa. The smaller sizes of  the 
project (preventing economies of  scale), the creditworthiness of  the 
off-taker, being the first auction, and being a landlocked country are 
factors negatively affecting cost-effectiveness (Meyer et al. 2015). The 
deadline for obtaining title to land was particularly tight and turnover 
(revenue) requirements for the solar tender may have been too high 
(Castalia LLC 2016). Tender documents for the solar procurement 
identified preferred zones for the location of  the proposed plants. 
Finally, GET FiT’s technical specifications may have been too strict, 
setting narrow requirements for individual components, rather than for 
the quality of  power produced, preventing developers from choosing the 
least-cost option to meet requirements (Castalia LLC 2016).
In Ghana, the preferred bidder’s offer of  11.7 US cents/KWh is lower 
than the FIT of  about 18 US cents/KWh and between the prices in 
Uganda and Zambia. However, in Ghana, the bidders had a 20 per 
cent local content requirement and concessional lending was not 
provided, as in Zambia and Uganda.
One of  the reasons for the site-specificity of  auctions in SSA is the 
weaknesses of  grids. The limited grid infrastructure in SSA countries 
constrains the choice of  sites. Those with the best solar resources are 
not chosen and, thus, direct generation costs (and bid prices) are not 
minimised. The sites in Ghana and Zambia were selected according 
to grid integration studies, which were performed to identify the 
amount of  variable RES-E which could be fed at various substations, 
considering technical constraints and resource availability. Although 
the first auction was not site-specific in Uganda, the next round may 
be site-specific as the government was supported in developing a grid 
integration model for variable RES-E, which takes into consideration 
their technical constraints and economic benefit to the system. 
Site-specificity can be recommended in SSA given that, as stressed by 
two interviewees, it is quite complicated to obtain different types of  
permits in these countries (access to land and infrastructure, connection 
permit, and environmental impact assessment). Identification of  these 
sites by the government makes it easier for project developers to obtain 
those permits and they usually favour this design element.
4.2.4 Impact on the local supply chain
The technological diversity provided by the projects is high regarding 
the electricity generation sources in three countries (since there was 
no solar PV connected to the grid), but low in the sense that the only 
RES-E supported by the auction is solar PV. The impact on the local 
supply chains will likely be low, since they are non-existing in the three 
countries and most investors are not local ones. This might be a little 
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bit different in Ghana, where there was a 20MWp PV plant prior to the 
auction, and where the 20 per cent local content requirement and the 
fact that there will be several other rounds can be expected to positively 
impact the local supply chain.14
5 Discussion and conclusions
This article has analysed the design choices in the auctions in three 
SSA countries and has provided an initial assessment of  their outcomes. 
Several lessons can be extracted from the experience with auctions in 
the three countries analysed. Note, however, that the experiences are 
nonetheless very limited and difficult to translate into general principles.
The three cases suggest that auctions can be an effective and 
cost-efficient way to introduce non-hydro renewable energy sources in 
countries with little existing experience in these sources such as those 
in SSA, changing the perception that cheap renewable energy projects 
cannot be deployed in poor countries with weak institutions and high 
costs for conducting business. The simplicity of  PV projects makes 
the setting of  support through auctions (rather than administratively) 
an appropriate choice since competition is likely to be greater than in 
projects with longer lead times (e.g. biomass).
Auctions for RES-E support might be useful to address some of  the 
constraints to RES-E investments in SSA, including limited economic 
resources and weak grids. Their simplicity and transparency in setting 
remuneration levels may make it attractive for potential investors and 
policymakers alike. Their alleged advantage in terms of  allocating 
efficiently the limited financial support available to RES-E is something 
particularly convenient in SSA countries, where economic resources are 
more limited, given budget constraints. They allow for the selection of  
good projects by experienced developers and discourage lower quality 
projects to go ahead. They also allow to control for the quantity of  
RES-E capacity connected to the grid, which is useful for purposes of  
grid management, particularly in SSA countries, which have weak grids.
However, auctions are not a panacea. This article has shown that, at 
least for SSA countries, the success of  auctions depends on the choice 
of  design elements, but it also depends on the existence of  an ‘enabling 
environment’, which implies minimum institutional, regulatory, human, 
financial, and infrastructure capabilities. In particular, auctions need 
to be complemented by other instruments which directly reduce risks. 
Thus, auctions must be part of  a more comprehensive combination 
of  measures (policy mix) which extends over time and which addresses 
the barriers to RES-E deployment mentioned in Section 1. Auctions 
should be part of  a broader package of  measures aimed at de-risking 
and capacity building (need for technical assistance for the design and 
implementation of  the auction processes). The experiences in SSA 
suggest that, in the context of  those countries, the auction procedure 
should be combined with market-based de-risking mechanisms which 
directly reduce the financing costs and participation risks in order 
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to attract potential bidders, and have appropriate competition levels 
and lower bid prices. This has been the case in the Scaling Solar 
programme in Zambia and the GET FiT programme in Uganda, which 
are programmes with auctions being one among other instruments. 
External financial support in the form of  a package of  de-risking/credit 
enhancement mechanisms has proven useful in this regard.
International institutions, such as the World Bank, and foreign 
governments have played and can play a very relevant role in this 
context. In particular, the World Bank Scaling Solar programme has 
contributed to mitigate international banks’ concerns about political 
risk, reducing the costs of  capital and making these emerging markets 
more appealing to developers. GET FiT includes a donor-financed 
premium to supplement the Ugandan FIT in the first five years of  
the project lifetime and the World Bank’s PRG to mitigate the risk of  
default by the utility (Quitzow et al. 2016). The standardised PPAs and 
IAs (implementation agreements) offered by GET FiT reduced the time 
needed to finance closure and signature of  the PPA and were important 
for lenders, because they reduced the cost of  legal due diligence.
In addition to a PPA plus de-risking, the programmes have reinforced 
the institutional capabilities in those countries by providing technical 
support. Technical assistance was included in the three countries 
in order to develop human, regulatory, and institutional capacities, 
investments in technical capacities for the development of  the grid, 
and financial mechanisms to reduce the financial risks and increase the 
financing capacity. According to one interviewee, technical assistance 
is necessary in auctions for RES-E in SSA countries, given the lack 
of  experience in renewable energy technologies and in international 
tenders. It is particularly recommendable, given the capital intensity 
of  these technologies, in order to give investors more confidence, 
improving selection of  projects and, thus, reducing bid prices.
The governance structure is different across the experiences in the three 
countries. The GET FiT programme in Uganda has a broader scope in 
the sense that it has a multi-stakeholder governance structure, involving 
the ERA, governmental stakeholders, donors, and a number of  energy 
sector and infrastructure investment experts, which monitors progress and 
proposes measures to address relevant challenges (GET FiT Uganda 2014; 
Quitzow et al. 2016). In this sense, the Zambian case is more ‘supply-driven’ 
(the World Bank steered the process rather than empowering local 
institutions to do it), whereas the cases in Uganda and Ghana are more 
demand-driven, with a committee with many actors, including local ones, 
where the respective governments played a dominant role.
Even if  auctions are supplemental to other policy measures and tools, 
they can play an important role in supporting RES-E effectively and 
cost-effectively. Whether they can meet the expectations depends on 
the choice of  design elements. Most of  the design choices made in 
the SSA auctions are deemed standard and appropriate in order to 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’ 79–100 | 97
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
address the constraints to RES-E investment in these countries. These 
include alternatives that enhance the simplicity and transparency 
of  design, which are key aspects to attract investors in a high-risk 
perceived environment such as the one existing in SSA countries: 
technology-specific (PV), sealed-bid with PAB, and price-only auctions. 
Site-specific auctions address problems related to a weak grid and 
obtaining administrative permits, which can be particularly burdensome 
in SSA countries. The strong pre-qualification requirements help to 
avoid underbidding and improve the effectiveness of  the scheme.
Finally, the transparency of  the auction schemes in the three countries 
should be stressed. This attracts the participation of  bidders, which has 
a positive impact on competition and, thus, on bid prices. However, an 
underlying problem in the SSA auctions is the lack of  proper energy 
planning, for example documents which indicate how much capacity will 
be needed in the medium and long terms and which technologies would 
cover such capacity. This complicates the efficiency and effectiveness of  
tenders, given the lack of  long-term signals on future volumes. Therefore, 
a national energy planning exercise would increase confidence of  the 
project developers and help government to plan a schedule for the 
tenders. Currently, each country has only organised a stand-alone auction.
Notes
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Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada, hlp@yorku.ca; GREA Innovacio 
Concurrent, INSPIRES Research Centre, Universitat de Lleida, Pere 
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Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), Madrid 28037, Spain,  
pablo.delrio@csic.es.
3 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 
ECREEE C.P. 288, Praia, Cape Verde, mohamed.sokona@giz.de.
4 According to The Economist (2016), Africa requires between US$60 
and US$90 billion annually to address its energy shortfall, roughly 
quadruple 2014 investment levels. The World Bank estimates that 
investments of  between US$120 billion and US$160 billion are 
required per annum in order to provide electricity access to the entire 
SSA region by 2030.
5 This section draws heavily on and summarises the findings of  the 
EU-funded Auctions for Renewable Energy Support (AURES) project. 
See del Río et al. (2015a, 2015b) and del Río (2015) for further details.
6 Full details on the description of  these criteria and how they were 
derived are provided in del Río et al. (2015a).
7 According to Tietenberg (2008:18), the least cost means of  achieving 
a target occurs when the marginal costs of  all possible means of  
achievement are equal.
8 Balancing costs occur due to deviations from schedule of  variable 
RES-E power plants, and the need for operating reserve and 
intraday adjustments in order to ensure system stability. Profile costs 
are mainly back-up costs, i.e. additional capacity of  dispatchable 
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technologies required due to the lower capacity credit of  
non-dispatchable RES-E. Grid costs are related to the reinforcement 
or extension of  transmission or distribution grids as well as 
congestion management, including re-dispatch required to manage 
situations of  high grid load (Breitschopf  and Held 2014).
9 South Africa was not included in the analysis for several reasons: 
(i) It is a very different country with respect to the others in 
fundamental aspects: economic structure and economic conditions, 
size, institutional capacities, etc. (ii) South Africa first implemented its 
auction scheme in 2011, i.e. it has a long-standing experience in RES 
auctions. This has likely resulted in policy learning over the years and 
improvements in the scheme. This is not the case in the other three 
SSA countries analysed. (iii) South Africa has been a well-researched 
country regarding RES auctions.
10 This last column is based on the analysis performed by the authors 
for 26 RES-E auction schemes from around the world.
11 The GET FiT premium gives small power producers FIP payments 
in addition to the national FIT. The costs for the already existing FIT 
are passed down to the consumers. However, the costs for the FIP 
payments are taken up by the donors. Small-scale biomass, hydro, 
bagasse, and solar PV plants can apply for the FIP payments.
12 This includes: enhancement of  skills for FIT tariff modelling, least 
cost development planning, solar PV tender, project due-diligence 
expertise, strategic communication, and negotiation.
13 These zones were defined after a review of  grid capacities, local loads, 
and solar radiation rates (Meyer et al. 2015). The tender documents 
also stated that projects had to be located no further than 3km from 
the grid and that all interconnection costs were to be borne by the 
bidder and included in tariff bids (Castalia LLC 2016).
14 In fact, two solar PV assembly lines have been inaugurated in Ghana 
(one of  which was part of  the winning consortium).
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